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THE NEW NORMAL TEN YEARS IN: THE JOB MARKET FOR
NEW LAWYERS TODAY AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE
LEGAL ACADEMY TOMORROW
Bernard A. Burk*
ABSTRACT
Despite record-low general unemployment and a strong economy, the
graduating law-school Class of 2017 entered a much smaller and more
constrained labor market than existed ten years before. Overall, the number
of entry-level, strongly law-related jobs (“Law Jobs”) that the Class of 2017
obtained was 26% lower than the Class of 2007, and remains at levels not
seen since the early 1990s. The only reason that greater proportions of the
graduating class are obtaining Law Jobs than in recent years is the dramatic
decrease in the number of students attending law school since 2010.
Examination of the various sectors of the entry-level Law-Jobs market
shows that no sector produces more Law Jobs today than it did in 2007. That
said, some sectors’ hiring shrank more than others. While there are fewer
entry-level Law Jobs overall today than in 2007, there were no drastic
changes in the non-law-firm sectors’ share of all Law Jobs or of the
graduating class. Among private law firms, it is the smallest (2–10 lawyers)
and the largest (over 500 lawyers) that have reduced their entry-level hiring
least.
In addition, a look at the pattern of entry-level hiring in the ABA’s “JD
Advantage” category (referring to jobs that are law-related but do not require
a law license) provides quantitative evidence that many of these positions
have long been, and remain, distinctly less preferred by and less satisfying
to new graduates than conventional law practice. These findings call into
doubt comments touting work that is merely law-related as the future of the
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profession, and suggest that most law schools would be wise to concentrate
on preparing their students for practice.
For reasons explained in detail, there is no reason to believe that any of
these patterns will change in the foreseeable future. Overall, this implies that
the steady and rapid entry-level legal-employment growth common from the
1970s through the mid-2000s is over, and a stable “New Normal” has
established itself. This New Normal likely will see only gradual growth in
entry-level Law-Jobs hiring at rates roughly equal to the growth rates of the
domestic population and economy—about 1%–2% per year overall.
These changes impose a straitened perspective on the recent increase in
applicants to law school in the 2017–2018 admissions cycle, the first
meaningful increase since 2010. Given that any substantial expansion in the
need for new lawyers is unlikely, any continued improvement in the
employment prospects of new law graduates at most law schools will be
dependent on keeping entering-class sizes steady or making them smaller.
Law schools that grow without a specific and quantifiable basis to predict
commensurate expansion in particular labor markets that they directly serve
risk diluting their graduates’ employment outcomes, with corresponding
adverse effects on their life and career prospects, as well as the reputation of
the institution.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article seeks to update the author’s earlier efforts to describe the
changes in the market for entry-level, strongly law-related jobs (“Law Jobs”)
for new law-school graduates, What’s New About the New Normal: The
Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century.1 Much has continued
to change in the last several years, but it may now be fair to suggest that a
true baseline “New Normal” with a definable shape and prospects has
emerged.
The Article begins with a discussion of the sources of the data used, and
the methods employed to conform those data to the qualitative categories
defined and examined.2
Those data are used to describe the stabilizing size and contours of the
entry-level Law-Jobs market. Despite record-low unemployment and a
generally strong economy, the graduating law-school Class of 2017 entered
a much smaller and more constrained labor market than existed ten years
before, which marked the height of the entry-level Law-Jobs market. Overall,
the number of Law Jobs that the Class of 2017 obtained was 26% lower than
the Class of 2007, and remains at levels not seen since the early 1990s. The
only reason that greater proportions of the graduating class are obtaining Law
Jobs than in recent years is the dramatic decrease in the number of students

1
Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers
in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541 (2014) [hereinafter Burk, New Normal].
2

See infra Part II.
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attending law school since 2010. But even those proportions remain 4.2
points (-6%) below the levels prevailing in the mid-2000s. If the legal
academy had been able to maintain its enrollment since 2010, more than half
of all law graduates today would not be able to find a job requiring a law
license within 10 months after graduating. As it is, more than a third of them
still can’t.3
In addition, a look at the pattern of entry-level hiring in the ABA’s “JD
Advantage” category (referring to jobs that are law-related but do not require
a law license) provides quantitative evidence that many of these positions
have long been, and remain, distinctly less preferred by and less satisfying to
new graduates than conventional law practice. These findings call into doubt
comments touting work that is merely law-related as the future of the
profession, and suggest that most law schools would be wise to concentrate
on preparing their students for practice.4
Examination of the various sectors of the entry-level Law-Jobs market
shows that no sector produces more Law Jobs today than it did in 2007. That
said, some sectors shrank more than others. While there are fewer entry-level
Law Jobs overall today than in 2007, there have been no drastic changes in
the non-law-firm employers’ relative share of the available Law Jobs or of
the graduating class.5
Among private law firms, entry-level hiring continues to vary by size of
firm.6 Medium Firms (11–50 lawyers) and Large Firms (51–500 lawyers)
have considerably contracted their entry-level hiring over the last ten years
as clients force them to do more with less. The outlook is less constrained at
the extremes: Small Firms (2–10 lawyers) and Very Large Firms (501+
lawyers), though hiring fewer new lawyers than they did in 2007, are hiring
relatively more than their mid- and large-sized competitors did at that time.
Very Large Firms have been increasing new hiring, and Small Firms appear
to be stabilizing new hiring at levels significantly higher than those during
the recessionary dip, while other sectors are stagnating or worse.7
For reasons explained in detail, there is no reason to believe that any of
these patterns will change in the foreseeable future as to any of the market
sectors examined.8 Overall, this prediction implies that the steady and rapid
growth in entry-level legal employment common from the 1970s through the
mid-2000s is over, and a true “New Normal” has established itself. This New
Normal will be characterized by gradual growth in entry-level Law Jobs at
3

See infra Part III.A.1.

4

See infra Part III.A.2.

5

See infra Part III.B.

6

See infra Tables 3.2, 3.3.

7

See infra Part III.C.

8

See infra Part IV.A.
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rates roughly equal to the growth rates of the domestic population and
economy—roughly 1%–2% per year overall.
These changes impose a straitened perspective on the roughly 8%
increase in applicants to law school in the 2017–2018 admissions cycle, the
first meaningful increase in applicants since 2010. As of 2016–17, the
average law-school entering class was 26% smaller than it was in 2010.
Given that any substantial expansion in the need for new lawyers is unlikely,
any continued improvement in the employment prospects of new law
graduates at most law schools will be dependent on keeping entering-class
sizes stable or making them smaller. Law schools that grow without a specific
and quantifiable basis to predict commensurate expansion in particular labor
markets that they directly serve risk diluting their graduates’ employment
outcomes, with corresponding adverse effects on their life and career
prospects, as well as the reputation of the institution.9
II. DATA AND METHODS
A.

Sources and Limitations of the Data

The data and methods used here are based on those originally developed
in the author’s earlier article.10 That paper included a 30-year study of the
entry-level employment market for lawyers based on the employment
outcomes that accredited law schools were required to report to the National
Association for Law Placement (“NALP”) and the American Bar Association
Section for Legal Education and Admission to the Bar (“ABA”).11
It bears repeating that both that study and this one are limited to entrylevel Law Jobs. In terms of the data relied on, that means jobs obtained by
law-school graduates within nine (and starting with the class of 2015, ten)
months of graduation and reported by their law schools as provided in the
ABA’s accreditation standards.12 The period between graduation and
reporting provides enough time for new graduates to study for and take a
licensing examination once, and to search for a job for a few months after
9

See infra Part IV.B.

10

See generally Burk, New Normal, supra note 1.

11

See id. at 550–53.

12

AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2018–2019, STANDARD 509(B) (2018); e.g., AM.
BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, EMPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS
(FOR
2018
GRADUATES)
(2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_
bar/Questionnaires/2019-employment-questionnaire-data-entry-questions.pdf [hereinafter 2018 ABA
Employment Questionnaire].
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receiving their results.13 The results documented and discussed here thus
amount to law graduates’ first jobs following graduation (or nearly first after
only a very short detour). The focus on entry-level employment does not
account for what graduates do at any time later in their careers, though failure
to obtain a law-practice or very closely law-related job promptly after
graduation appears to have been, and to remain, likely to seriously hamper or
altogether prevent any intended career as a lawyer.14
It also bears repeating that the data gathered by NALP and the ABA has
evolved over time, but in many important respects has never closely
conformed to any qualitatively optimal definition of the kinds of employment
this study and its predecessor seek to document. Approximations and
estimates of various kinds are necessary, though this is hardly unusual in
empirical studies.15
B.

The Time Frame of the Data Examined

Although NALP and the ABA began gathering employment data from
law schools in 1975, this study focuses on such data for background and
context beginning in 1991 when examining the Law-Jobs market as a whole,
13 See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1. Historically, the bar exam has been administered twice
per year in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, once at the end of July, and once at the end of
February. Results for the July administration (which is the one that most recent law graduates sit for) have
generally been announced, depending on the jurisdiction, between Labor Day and Thanksgiving. Law
Schools were asked (and as of 1996, required (see id. at 568 n.54)) to report on their most recent graduates’
employment outcomes on March 7 of the year following their graduation (with results posted on the
school’s website by March 15) until 2015, when results were to be reported by April 7 (with posting by
April 15). See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, PROTOCOL FOR
REVIEWING LAW GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT DATA, AND STATEMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTING,
MAINTAINING, AND REPORTING LAW GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT DATA – FINAL 11 (2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_
bar/governancedocuments/2014_june_protocol_and_statement_employment_data_final.authcheckdam.p
df.
14 See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 546–47; Anonymous Recruitment Director, Anonymous
Recruitment Director Answers Your Email Questions (Part 1), ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/anonymous-recruitment-director-answers-your-email-questions-part1/ (“A lawyer who is unemployed for two months is more employable to a prospective employer than a
lawyer who has been unemployed for 14 months.”); Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/anexistential-crisis-for-law-schools.html; Annie Lowrey, Caught in a Revolving Door of Unemployment,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/business/caught-in-unemploymentsrevolving-door.html (describing the increasing difficulty of obtaining employment the longer a worker
remains unemployed).
15 For a detailed description of how the employment outcomes data collected and reported has
evolved since NALP and ABA began the effort in the 1970s, and its limitations in describing employment
outcomes for purposes such as those involved here, see Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 546–47, 550–
55.
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and beginning in 2001 when considering separate market sectors. In 1975,
nearly half of all new graduates’ employment outcomes (45%) either are not
reported at all (because their schools reported no employment data), or are
disclosed by reporting schools as “employment status unknown”; by the early
1980s the total remains a quarter to a third.16 The employment status of about
23% of all new graduates is still unknown by 1991, but from there the
proportion shrinks steadily, especially after 1996, when disclosure of
employment outcomes became a mandatory condition of accreditation.17 The
proportion of unreported or unknown outcomes falls under 10% in the late
1990s, and under 5% in 2012.18
In addition, “JD-Advantage” jobs (also referred to at some points in the
ABA/NALP data as “JD Preferred,” but abbreviated here “JDA”)—ones that
are to some degree law-related but that do not require a law license—are not
broken out from those requiring a law license (“Bar Passage Required” or
“BPR” jobs) until after 2000. Before that, NALP and the ABA categorized
jobs as either “Legal” or “Non-Legal,” with Legal positions apparently
including some work not requiring a law license, and Non-Legal positions
including both some law-related careers not explicitly amounting to the
practice of law as well as non-law-related work.19 Focusing on data starting
with the Class of 2001 for separate market sectors thus allows for more
consistent reporting and comparisons.
C.

What Counts as a “Law Job”?

Qualitatively, this author’s definition of the kind of employment
outcome that counts as a Law Job is one
that someone would, ex ante, rationally plan to attend law
school to obtain. This should include only placements for
16

See id. at 566–68 & fig.3.

17

Id. at 568 & n.54.

Id. at 566–68 & fig.3. As discussed in the earlier study (id. at 567–68, 570–71), unreported and
unknown results are more likely to be bad outcomes, simply because law schools and graduates have
natural incentives to discover and report good ones. That said, some of the unreported or unknown results
were likely Law Jobs, especially when a number of law schools were not reporting at all, resulting in at
least some undercounting of Law Jobs and some understatement of the Law-Jobs Ratio (which counts all
unknown outcomes as not employed in a Law Job).
18

19 When the distinction switches from Legal vs. Non-Legal to BPR vs. JDA (and other less lawrelated categories) after 2000, the number of BPR positions drops noticeably year-over year in 2001 while
the total of BPR + JDA jobs jumps noticeably. A fair inference is that what reporting schools now call
JDA jobs were previously divided between the “Legal” and “Non-Legal” categories. See id. at 565 fig.1
(depicting the Law-Jobs Ratio, or proportion of the graduating class securing a Law Job). For detailed
discussion of the development of the standards for Legal vs. Non-Legal and BPR vs. JDA jobs, and the
indeterminacy and ease of abuse of both, see id. at 555–59.
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which a law degree is typically a necessary or extremely
valuable substantive preparation (as opposed to being
merely useful or relevant); or put slightly differently, the law
degree must provide dramatic and substantial advantages in
obtaining or performing the job not more easily obtainable
or substitutable (whether in nature or extent) another way.20
This standard is objective, and although necessarily imprecise, does its best
to limit the uncertainty in categorizing law-related jobs. As part of that effort,
it skirts the shoals of hedonic (individual satisfaction-based) and economic
(compensation-based) measures.21
Quantitatively, this definition results in a measure based on NALP and
ABA employment-outcome data that counts as “Law Jobs” any “Bar Passage
Required” placement that is full-time, long-term, and non-school-funded,
excluding “JD Advantage” and solo practice positions, and counting as not
employed in a Law Job those pursuing a further degree or whose status is
unreported or unknown.22
D.

The Law-Jobs Ratio

Qualitatively, the Law-Jobs Ratio is intended to approximate the
proportion of the aggregate graduating class that obtained a Law Job within
nine (or beginning with the class of 2015, ten) months of graduation.
Quantitatively, it is determined simply by dividing the aggregate number of

20

Id. at 547.

See id. at 547–50. In brief, individual satisfaction is all but impossible to measure. As for
compensation-based measures, the data available are less complete and thus probably less reliable than
for the measures used here, and more importantly many placements traditionally viewed as desirable and
sought-after Law Jobs are much less remunerative than those available at large law firms. See Bill
Henderson, How the “Cravath System” Created the Bi-Modal Distribution, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
(July 18, 2008), https://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2008/07/how-the-cravath.html.
21

22 See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 555–63 (discussing the reasons for the inclusions and
exclusions, and their potential effects on accurately approximating the preferred qualitative definition).
Unemployed graduates at nine or ten months are treated as unemployed whether or not they are reported
as “seeking” employment. Id. at 561–62. Beginning with the Class of 2015, the ABA has reported schoolfunded positions separately from conventional BPR and JDA placements, before that, school-funded
positions were included in conventional BPR and JDA placements if they otherwise qualified. For recent
definitions of these categories, see AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
EMPLOYMENT
PROTOCOLS
FOR
THE
CLASS
OF
2018,
at
5–7
(2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_
bar/Questionnaires/2019_EQ_Protocol_FINAL.pdf (2018); 2018 ABA Employment Questionnaire, supra
note 12, at 1–5.
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Bar-Passage-Required Law Jobs reported for the aggregate graduating class
by the total number of graduates from all law schools in that same class.23
E.

A Note on Counting Law Jobs in Separate Market Sectors

The numerator of the Law-Jobs Ratio (as defined here; that is, the total
number of “Law Jobs”) is relatively easy to determine after the Class of 2010
because at that point the ABA and NALP started requiring reporting schools
to disclose specifically the total number of full-time, long-term, Bar-PassageRequired placements each graduating class obtained. Counting Law Jobs
before the Class of 2011, or broken down by market sector, becomes more
difficult and uncertain, however.
Before the Class of 2011, the proportion of each market sector’s BarPassage-Required placements that is part-time, short-term, or both (and thus
not a “Law Job” as defined here) must be estimated.24 The estimates of those
proportions through the Class of 2010 that are used here are those developed
in the prior study.25 In addition, when the ABA and NALP first introduced
BPR, JDA, and related categorizations for the Class of 2001, NALP also
provided breakdowns of the non-law-firm market sectors specifying the
proportion in each that was Bar-Passage-Required. Those are used here to
factor out the non-Law Jobs in each non-law-firm market sector.26 Even in

23 See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 564. Because Law Jobs exclude from the Ratio’s
numerator solo practitioners and JDA positions as well as unreported and unknown placements, some of
which would likely qualify as Law Jobs under the qualitative definition used here, and because all
graduates (including those seeking a further degree, those reported as not seeking employment, and those
whose outcomes are unreported or unknown) are included in the denominator, the Law-Jobs Ratio will
tend to understate somewhat the proportion of graduates actually holding a Law Job. For the reasons
discussed (see id. at 555–63) this more conservative approach is believed to result in less undercounting
than the overcounting that would result if these policies were reversed. Counting a portion of these
positions is no better, as there are no reliable data by which a meaningful proportion could be estimated.
24 For definitions of “full-time” and “long-term,” see 2018 ABA Employment Questionnaire, supra
note 12, at 2.
25

See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 552–53.

“Academia,” which is referred to in the most recent ABA and NALP reports as “Education,”
includes not only professorial appointments in law schools (which are rare straight out of law school), but
also any teaching or school administrator or librarian position at any educational level. See 2018 ABA
Employment Questionnaire, supra note 12, at 10–17. Accordingly, the vast majority of these positions are
not “Law Jobs.” Similarly, a position in Business & Industry could be any job with a for-profit business,
for example an in-house lawyer, a non-lawyer manager or salesperson, a manual laborer on an assembly
line, or a janitor. The latter three are not “Law Jobs”; while they are steady, honest work, they are not the
sort of positions a rational person would invest the time and money necessary to attend law school to
obtain. See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 547–50; supra Part II.C. Placements in the Government
and Public Interest categories likewise contain some mix of Law Jobs and non-Law Jobs, which varies
from category to category and over time. All Judicial Clerkships that are full-time and long-term (that is,
lasting a year or more) are treated as Law Jobs. Virtually all such positions meet the qualitative test applied
26
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private law firms, a small portion of new-graduate hires (typically around
6%-7% each year in the aggregate) fill positions not requiring a law license,
such as legal secretary (administrative assistant) or paralegal.27
III. WHAT THE NEW NORMAL HAS TURNED OUT TO BE
This section will discuss the evolution of the Law-Jobs market since
1991 both as a whole and by sector in an effort to put the entry-level Law Job
market’s current condition in perspective. In addition to graphs illustrating
trends, the reporting includes two charts with numbers at a few consistent
reference points for the market as a whole and its various sectors. The
reference points are:
•

1991: The beginning of the comparison period for the
Law-Jobs market as a whole, and a time when nonreporting starts to fall below levels that make counting
unacceptably unreliable;28

here for a Law Job: They traditionally serve as a stepping-stone after a year or two to another more
permanent Law Job, or are themselves a more permanent position as a court’s staff attorney.
27 For the Class of 2011 forward, NALP provides a breakdown of law-firm categories by size,
which includes full-time BPR jobs in each category as well as positions reported in each category as parttime and short-term. See, e.g., NALP, JOBS & JDS: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES OF NEW LAW
GRADUATES, CLASS OF 2017 34 (2018) [hereinafter JOBS & JDS, CLASS OF 2017]. Unfortunately, these
three groupings are not mutually exclusive, which means that the BPR percentage includes some shortterm jobs (and apparently the short-term figures include some non-BPR jobs). For clarity and consistency
this study, like its predecessor, applies the single BPR percentage that NALP furnishes for all private law
firms in the aggregate to each separate size category of law firm, and uses the number of full-time, longterm BPR jobs in that size category provided by the ABA. This introduces some distortion: The data
NALP makes available suggests that, at least in recent years, the smaller the firm, the greater the
proportion of non-Law Job new hires, with the smallest firms significantly more likely to hire new
graduates as other than practicing lawyers—roughly 15%-20% of them. For example, the JOBS & JDS,
CLASS OF 2017, supra, lists the following percentages of full-time BPR jobs by size category:

Size

% Full-Time
BPR

1-10

84.4%

11-25

94.1%

26-50

94.3%

51-100

97.1%

101-250

97.1%

251-500

97.6%

501+

99.0%

All

92.4%
28

See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
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•

2001: The end of the effects of the dot-com recession on
the entry-level Law-Jobs market, and the beginning of
the biggest “rally” in the history of that job market;29
2007: The graduating class that enjoyed the most Law
Jobs in most sectors of the market, and the highest LawJobs Ratio, since systematic gathering of employment
information began in 1975;30
2013: The reporting endpoint of the author’s previous
description of the Law-Jobs market, and the end of what
had appeared to be a partial recovery but proved to be a
“dead-cat bounce”;31
2017: The reporting endpoint of this paper.

•

•

•
A.

351

The Entry-Level Law-Jobs Market Overall

Table 3.1
Whole Entry-Level Law-Jobs Market at Various Comparison Points
Classes of 1991–2017
Year

1991

2001

2007

2013

2017

Number of Law Jobs
Number of JDA Jobs
Number of Graduates
Law-Jobs Ratio

22,827
n/a
38,800
58.8%

25,812
2,057
37,909
68.1%

30,509
3,129
43,518
70.1%

26,637
4,714
46,776
53.6%

22,370
3,072
34,391
65.9%

1.

The Number of Law Jobs and the Law-Jobs Ratio

As the market for entry-level Law Jobs contracted rapidly and
substantially after 2007, many voices in the academy insisted that the
employment downturn was, like the recession with which it coincided,
temporary and cyclical. This view turned out to be wrong.32 As the drop in
the number of Law Jobs levelled out more recently, some again predictably
suggested that the job market was returning to its former strength and

29

See infra Figs. 3.1–3.2.

30

See infra Table 3.1 and Figs. 3.1–3.2.

See infra Table 3.1 and Figs. 3.1–3.2 “Dead-cat bounce” is a term borrowed from the financial
markets, referring to a small bounce upward after a significant fall, and which (because the “cat” has
“died” from the fall), quickly falls back down again. See Dead Cat Bounce, URBAN DICTIONARY
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=dead%20cat%20bounce (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
31

32

See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1. This author took the opposite view. Id. at 591–95.
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capacity, and was even “hot.”33 But if there is one thing a reader takes away
from this Article, let it be that this description is simply inaccurate. Both
historical trends and current figures illustrate the reality.
Figure 3.1 depicts the source of some observers’ excitement:
Figure 3.1
Law-Jobs Ratio (Excluding JDA)
Classes of 1991–2017
80.00
75.00
70.00
65.00
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55.00
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45.00
40.00
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

What this graph shows is that the Law-Jobs Ratio (the proportion of the
graduating class that obtained a Law Job within 9–10 months of graduation)
bottomed out in 2011, and has risen steadily since. But this observation
disregards the sole reason the Ratio has increased, which is illustrated in
Figure 3.2:

33 See, e.g., Hilary Mantis, Employment Market is Hot, Choose Wisely, 28 NAT’L JURIST 1, 38
(2018), http://cdn.coverstand.com/52741/521323/8526434acf7295bb6dcf2114c8e7a5ede8f1b592.1.pdf
(“Those entering the legal job market can breathe a sigh of relief.”). While NALP issued a much more
nuanced press release detailing the very limited improvements in entry-level legal employment, JUDITH
N. COLLINS, OVERALL EMPLOYMENT RATE UP MODESTLY EMPLOYMENT IN LEGAL JOBS UP MORE, JOBS
& JDS: EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CLASS OF 2017—SELECTED FINDINGS (2018),
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/SelectedFindingsClassof2017.pdf, and industry journalists also fairly
reported the decidedly less-than-optimistic results, headline writers relentlessly accentuated the positive
at the expense of the larger picture. See, e.g., Staci Zaretsky, Job Market For Law School Grads Is ‘Best
Since The Recession,’ Bolstered By Biglaw Hiring, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:16 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/08/job-market-for-law-school-grads-is-best-since-the-recessionbolstered-by-biglaw-hiring/ (with subheading “Exciting News that Must be Tempered with Some Cold,
Hard Facts”); Karen Sloan, Job Market for Law Grads ‘Surprisingly Strong,’ NALP Finds, LAW.COM
(Aug. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/08/01/job-market-for-law-grads-surprisinglystrong-nalp-finds/.
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Figure 3.2
Number of Entry-Level Law Jobs (BPR) and Total Graduates
Classes of 1991–2017
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45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Law Jobs

Total Graduates

As Figure 3.2 shows, the number of Law Jobs has fallen in most years
since its peak in 2007, although it now appears to be flattening out at levels
well below those prevailing ten years ago. Specifically, following a big
tumble from 2007-2011 and a slight recovery (“dead-cat bounce”) in 20122013, the number of Law Jobs was down year-over-year for the classes of
2014 (-7.7%), 2015 (-6.1%), and 2016 (-2.6%). It was effectively flat in 2017
(+0.8%). Overall, the number of Law Jobs is 25.7% lower for the Class of
2017 than it was for the Class of 2007, and remains at levels not seen since
the early 1990s.
As Figure 3.2 also shows, the reason for the rise in the Law-Jobs Ratio
in recent years is simply that the denominator of the Ratio—the number of
new graduates—has gotten much smaller: 23% fewer graduates than when
the Law-Jobs Ratio bottomed out in 2011, and 21% fewer graduates than at
the peak of the Law-Jobs market in 2007. In other words, because there are
so many fewer graduates chasing the reduced number of Law Jobs today,
more of those graduates are succeeding. But there are still many thousands
fewer Law Jobs today than there were 10 years ago.34 The implications of
these critical facts are discussed below.35

34 The falling number of law-school graduates predictably follows from a substantial reduction in
the number of people applying to and beginning law school. Unique applicants fell 36%, and applications
fell 44%, between the classes starting in fall 2010 and fall 2016. The number of JD-degree matriculants
fell 27% during that same period. See Bernard A. Burk, Jerome M. Organ & Emma B. Rasiel, Competitive
Coping Strategies in the American Legal Academy: An Empirical Study, 19 NEV. L.J. & App. 1
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 12–14) (on file with author) [hereinafter Burk, Organ & Rasiel, Coping
Strategies].
35

See infra Part IV.C.
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A Note About JD-Advantage Jobs

As discussed in the previous study, NALP’s and the ABA’s definition
of JD-Advantage (or JD-Preferred) placements fits poorly with the
qualitative definition of a Law Job used here, namely a placement that at least
potentially justifies the time and expense to obtain a law degree. More
specifically, the prevailing definition of a “JD Advantage” job is prone to
overinclusiveness. As a result, the category has created temptations for, and
likely some actual, misreporting.36 These placements are accordingly
excluded from the count of “Law Jobs” in this and the prior study.
The trends in the number of postgraduate placements reported as JD
Advantage since the last study’s publication confirm the analysis proposed
there:
Figure 3.3
Number of JD-Advantage Jobs
Classes of 2001–2017
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After a sudden drop in JDA jobs, which coincided with rapidly rising
unemployment generally and in the legal sector during the credit crisis of
2008 and 2009, the number of JDA placements gradually doubled as the
number of BPR jobs fell and the number of new law graduates continued to
rise. As the number of BPR jobs started to level out, the number of graduates
per year started to fall (in 2014, reflecting decreasing enrollments starting

36 See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 555–59 (also providing a history of law-related job
categories promulgated by NALP and the ABA over the roughly 40 years they have been collecting
employment data from law schools).
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three years earlier), and the Law-Jobs Ratio started to rise again. During this
time, the number of reported JDA jobs began to fall, and has continued to do
so as graduates’ chances of obtaining a BPR placement (as directly measured
by the Law-Jobs Ratio) continued to increase.
In other words, the harder it has been for the average new graduate to
get a BPR job, the more new graduates (and, perhaps, their reporting law
schools in interpreting outcomes) resort to JDA placements. These trends
illustrate that JDA work has long been, and still is, a widely and significantly
less-preferred alternative to BPR work for most new graduates (and may also
be a reporting alternative on which administrators rely more aggressively
when conventional BPR placements are weaker).37 This inference is
supported quantitatively by the fact that since 2001, when the JDA category
was first reported, the aggregate number of JDA placements at accredited law
schools is inversely correlated with the Law-Jobs Ratio (which is effectively
a measurement of the likelihood of the average new graduate’s obtaining an
entry-level BPR Law Job).38 It is also supported quantitatively by the fact that
the proportion of JDA-job holders who report that they are seeking other
employment remains close to 40%, over four times the proportion of BPRjob holders looking to change jobs.39 In short, the easier it is for new
graduates to find a BPR job, the less likely those graduates are to take a JDA
job; and a lot more JDA job-holders than conventional BPR job-holders are
looking for a different (and presumably more directly law-related) job just 10
months after graduating.
These findings cast grave doubt on any assertion that the future of postlaw-school employment will and should increasingly be merely law-related
rather than in conventional law practice; or that JD-Advantage placements
should generally be considered just as satisfying, sought-after or “good” as
conventional Bar Passage Required placements.40

37

Compare supra Fig. 3.3, with supra Table 3.1, and supra Figs. 3.1 & 3.2.

From 2001-2017, ρ = -68%; p < .003. ρ (the Greek letter rho) is the correlation coefficient, a
statistical measure about the degree to which two datasets tend to move in the same direction and
magnitude; a negative correlation coefficient indicates an inverse correlation and shows that the two
datasets tend to move in opposite directions. The p-value is the probability that the correlation occurred
merely by chance; p-values less than .05 are typically viewed as statistically significant.
38

39 JOBS & JDS, CLASS OF 2017, supra note 27, at 128 (38.7% of all JDA job holders seeking other
employment vs. 8.8% of all BPR job holders).
40 These concerns are appreciably less applicable to the small group of the most selective and
highly-regarded law schools in the nation. These schools tend to attract extraordinarily talented and
creative students whose career aspirations somewhat more frequently point off the beaten path of
conventional law practice. Yale Law School is probably the most extreme example: Its Class of 2017 had
a Law-Jobs Ratio of only 75%, with 6% more in JDA placements and another 10% in school-funded
public-interest positions (including short-term and part-time). Stanford Law School similarly had a LawJobs Ratio of 82%, with another 8% reported in JDA positions and 3.6% in school-funded positions. These
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These findings have strong implications for the future direction of lawschool curricula, which are predominantly a topic for another day. But in
broad overview, they tend to suggest that the typical law school is wiser
focusing on preparing its students more effectively for conventional law
practice rather than for imaginary hybrid vocations lurking just over the
horizon.
B.

Market Sectors: Non-Law-Firm Law Jobs

Non-law-firm work includes several distinct categories of employers.
As discussed above, the NALP and ABA data distinguish Academia,
Business, Government, Judicial Law Clerks, and Public Interest.41
Table 3.2
Non-Law-Firm Entry-Level Law Jobs by Category
At Various Comparison Points (estimated)
Classes of 2001–2017
Class Year

2001

2007

2013

2017

Academic

Number of Law Jobs
% of all Law Jobs
% of all grads

56
0.2%
0.1%

87
0.3%
0.2%

96
0.4%
0.2%

52
0.2%
0.2%

Business

Number of Law Jobs
% of all Law Jobs
% of all grads

965
3.7%
2.5%

1,665
5.5%
3.8%

1,546
5.8%
3.3%

860
3.8%
2.5%

Government
(excl. judicial
law clerks)

Number of Law Jobs
% of all Law Jobs
% of all grads

3,262
12.6%
8.6%

3,412
11.2%
7.8%

3,156
11.8%
6.7%

2,846
12.6%
8.3%

results were likely the result of actual student preferences rather than second-best solutions, and
undoubtedly included some unique and exciting outcomes involving unconventional uses of a law degree.
Even so, many of the most highly regarded law schools in the country have very high Law-Jobs Ratios.
For example, for the Class of 2017, whose overall Law-Jobs Ratio according to the methodology described
above is 66%, Duke has a Law-Jobs Ratio of 94% +1.7% school-funded, 2% JDA; Columbia: 93% + 3%
school-funded, 0% JDA; University of Virginia: 92% + 3% school-funded, 2% JDA; University of
Chicago: 92% + 4% school-funded, 2% JDA; University of Pennsylvania: 91% + 2% school-funded, 6%
JDA. Simply put, at most of the best-reputed law schools, graduates concentrate overwhelmingly in
conventional law-practice placements.
41 For the period through the Class of 2010, the proportion of each category comprising full-time,
long-term placements must be estimated. NALP has provided a proportion of each category’s placements
that is Bar-Passage-Required (except for Judicial Clerkships, as to which all full-time, long-term
placements are assumed to be Law Jobs). See supra Part I.E. The number of entry-level Law Jobs with
Academic employers each year is so small that they are not graphed in Figures 3.4A-C.
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Judicial Law
Clerks

Number of Law Jobs
% of all Law Jobs
% of all grads

3,397
13.2%
9.0%

3,397
11.1%
7.8%

3,317
12.5%
7.1%

3,156
13.9%
9.2%

Public
Interest

Number of Law Jobs
% of all Law Jobs
% of all grads

693
2.7%
1.8%

1,701
5.6%
3.9%

1,294
4.9%
2.8%

1,173
5.2%
3.4%

Total NonLaw-Firm
Law Jobs

Number of Law Jobs
% of all Law Jobs
% of all grads

8,373
32.4%
22.1%

10,262
33.6%
23.6%

9,409
35.3%
20.1%

8,087
35.7%
23.5%

Fig. 3.4A
Number of Non-Law-Firm Entry-Level Law Jobs
Per Year by Category
Classes of 2001–2017
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Fig. 3.4B
Non-Law-Firm Entry-Level Law Jobs Per Year by Category
As a Percentage of Total Law Jobs Per Year
Classes of 2001–2017
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Fig. 3.4C
Non-Law-Firm Entry-Level Law Jobs Per Year by Category
As a Percentage of Total Graduates Per Year
Classes of 2001–2017
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As Figures 3.4A–C show, non-law-firm Law-Job hiring has been
relatively flat over the last 20 years except for a significant drop from 2007
to 2009, and a fairly gradual recovery since then. No category of non-lawfirm employer provides a greater number of Law Jobs today than it did in
2007. Government and Judicial-Clerkship hiring have shrunk less than the
other categories, and thus consume a slightly bigger share of the overall Law
Jobs obtained recently and a slightly larger portion of the graduating class.
Overall, non-law-firm Law Jobs have fallen in number (-21.2%), but they
comprise roughly the same proportion of the Law Jobs annually as they did
before the Great Recession, and about the same proportion of the aggregate
graduating class.42
C.

Market Sectors: Private Law-Firm Law Jobs43

Table 3.3
Entry-Level Law-Firm Jobs at Various Comparison Points
Classes of 1991–2017
Year
All Law Firms
(excl. solos)

Solo Practice

2001

2007

2013

2017

number
% of Law Jobs
% of all grads

14,624
56.7%
38.6%

17,409
57.1%
40.0%

15,620
58.6%
33.4%

14,147
62.4%
41.1%

number
% of Law Jobs

428
1.7%

532
1.7%

941
3.5%

390
1.7%

% of all grads

1.1%

1.2%

2.0%

1.1%

42 All of these quantifications depend on the accuracy of the estimation process described in supra
Part I.E. One small anomaly that emerges is that the proportions of all Law Jobs comprising non-law-firm
and law-firm Law Jobs are both up modestly from 2007 to 2017. This is likely attributable in part to some
variation in the accuracy of estimation year to year, but more substantially to shrinking numbers of
unknown-category BPR Law Jobs. These unknown-category jobs are not categorized as either law-firm
or non-law-firm, as a result of which those two categories alone do not total 100% in any year. In fact, the
difference in the total proportion of law-firm plus non-law-firm Law Jobs in 2007 (90.7%) and 2017
(98.1%) equals the amount by which the proportion of all Law Jobs that non-law-firm Law Jobs (+2.1%)
and law-firm Law Jobs (+5.3%) increased over the same period.
43 The vigilant reader will notice that the categorizations of private firms by size in this Article
(discussed in the text that follows) differ from those in the earlier article on which it expands. Compare
infra Table 3.3, with Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 572, Figs. 4A & 4B. This shift is partly a result
of patterns that emerged more clearly over the additional years between the two papers, but in all candor
the earlier categorizations may also have been influenced by the author’s preconceptions of the meaning
of certain size gradations. Regardless of the reasons, private firms have been grouped together in this
Article according to their similar patterns of entry-level hiring over time. No claim is made about whether
the firms in the size categories used here to measure entry-level hiring also perform comparably (similarly
within categories and differently among categories) in other performance metrics, such as promotion rates,
gross revenues, profitability, etc. That is an interesting and important inquiry for another day.
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number
% of Law Jobs

4,496
17.4%

5,949
19.5%

6,502
24.4%

4,839
21.3%

% of all grads

11.9%

13.7%

13.9%

14.1%

number
% of Law Jobs

2,585
10.0%

2,813
9.2%

2,697
10.1%

2,432
10.7%

% of all grads

6.8%

6.5%

5.8%

7.1%

number
% of Law Jobs

4,990
19.3%

4,276
14.0%

2,721
10.2%

2,563
11.3%

% of all grads

13.2%

9.8%

5.8%

7.5%

number
% of Law Jobs

2,553
9.9%

4,371
14.3%

3,700
13.9%

4,312
19.0%

% of all grads

6.7%

10.0%

7.9%

12.5%

As Table 3.3 shows, the number of new law graduates taking jobs in
private law firms (excluding solo practitioners)44 is roughly the same as it
was in 2001 and is down 18.7% since 2007. As we will see, no subcategory
of law firm is hiring more new lawyers today than it did in 2007. At the same
time, the relative proportions of different-sized law firms’ share of overall
Law-Jobs hiring also has changed in the last ten years.
Figure 3.5
Entry-Level Law-Firm Jobs (All Firms Except Solos)
Classes of 2001–2017
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44 The exclusion of immediately post-graduate solo practice from “Law Jobs” is explained in Burk,
New Normal, supra note 1, at 560–61. As discussed in supra Part II.B.2, and illustrated in supra Table
3.3, and infra Fig. 3.6, only a small number of new graduates immediately strike out on their own in any
event, historically (and currently) roughly 1%–2% of the graduating class per year since 1991.
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Solo Practitioners

As Table 2.3 shows, there have never been very many graduates who
hang out their own shingles straight out of law school. However, roughly one
in three lawyers eventually ends up in solo practice, almost all after gaining
experience in supervised placements.45
Figure 3.6
Entry-Level Solo Practitioners
Classes of 2001–2017
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The number of solo practitioners starting straight out of law school has
hovered between 1% and 2% of the aggregate graduating class since 1991.46
Solo practice straight out of law school is a disfavored outcome among new
law graduates, a perspective reflected not only in the consistently low
numbers of graduates who choose this path, but also by the fact that the
outcome is negatively correlated with law-school prestige, reflecting that the
greater the range of other options graduates are presented, the less likely they
are to select immediate solo practice.47 As reflected in Figure 3.6, solo
practice’s share of all Law Jobs rose to record highs during major
contractions in the entry-level Law-Jobs market—around 4% of all entrylevel Law Jobs in 2009-13, when appreciably fewer alternatives were
available. Recent years’ results are consistent, in that the number of
45

Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 560–61; see supra notes 40–43.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 561; supra note 42.
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immediately post-graduate solos, as well as their proportion of all Law Jobs
and of the aggregate graduating class, has fallen from the relative (though
still very modest) highs of the early 2010s as the Law-Jobs Ratio has
increased, and the alternative placements available to new law graduates have
correspondingly broadened.48
2.

Small Firms (2–10 Lawyers)49

Small firms reacted to the contraction of the overall Law-Jobs market
that began after 2007 in a manner distinct from other sectors of the job
market:
Figure 3.7
Entry-Level Law Jobs in Small Firms (2–10 Lawyers)
Classes of 2001–2017
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As Figure 3.7 shows, entry-level hiring in Small Firms plummeted after
the onset of the Great Recession, but only briefly. This was a period in which
the demand for legal work generally and suddenly fell as the economy seized
up in reaction to the Great Recession’s credit crisis, general unemployment
rapidly increased, and the middle-class individuals and small businesses

48

See supra Fig. 3.1.

The ABA breaks private-firm employment data into categories by firm size. These categories
include firms of 2–10 lawyers, 11–25 lawyers, 26–50 lawyers, 51–100 lawyers, 10–250 lawyers, 251–500
lawyers, and more than 501 lawyers. The hiring patterns described in this section are most prominent and
accentuated in the 2–10 lawyer category. While the hiring patterns of firms of 11–25 unsurprisingly echo
those of firms of both 2–10 and 26–50, they more strongly resemble those of the next larger category, and
thus firms of 11–50 are grouped together in this study as “Medium” sized.
49
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predominantly served by Small Firms had fewer resources to devote to legal
services.50
The contraction in large-firm hiring continued for some years after 2009
and remained at lower levels than before the recession when it stabilized,
while the business of smaller firms apparently recovered more quickly.51
Greater numbers of new graduates thus were driven to positions with small
firms, which temporarily had relatively greater need than their larger siblings
and were more than happy to find students with what previously would have
been Big-Law credentials ready and willing to sign on. From 2009 on, the
smallest and largest firms’ hiring have tended to move inversely to one
another to an extent not found with other hiring categories.52
Small-Firm hiring for the Class of 2017 is nevertheless down 25.6% in
number from its peak in 2013, and down 18.7% from 2007. It is up 7.6% in
number since 2001 and, significantly, even though down in number since
2007, consumes a larger proportion of total Law Jobs (up 1.8 points = +9.2%)
and the aggregate graduating class (up 0.4 points = +2.9%) than it did in
2007. Today over 20% of all new Law Jobs, and about 14% of the entire
graduating class, start in Small Firms. It is currently the largest sector of the
new Law-Jobs market.
3.

Medium Firms (11–50 Lawyers)53

Medium-sized Firms share hiring patterns reminiscent of both Small and
Large Firms, though to a lesser degree than either:

50 See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future
of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–33 (2011) [hereinafter Burk &
McGowan, Big But Brittle].
51 See infra Figs. 3.9–3.10. This is consistent with the observation, apparent from the graphs in
this Part, that BigLaw is generally more cyclically sensitive than smaller firms.
52

Compare supra Fig. 3.7, with infra Fig. 3.10.

In a bridging pattern similar to that between small and medium firms (see supra note 50), firms
of 11–50 lawyers show hiring patterns that resemble those of firms of both 2–10 and 51–100. Firms of
11–50 show patterns sufficiently similar to one another and different from the next larger or smaller
category to be grouped together as “Medium”-sized.
53
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Figure 3.8
Entry-Level Law Jobs in Medium Firms (11–50 Lawyers)
Classes of 2001–2017
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%

20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17

0.0%
number

% of Law Lobs

% of all grads

Like Small Firms, Medium Firms show a hiring dip in 2008–10 and a
hiring spike in 2011–13, but both are smaller than those exhibited by Small
Firms.54 Medium Firms do not show the accelerating growth in the 1990s and
2000s characteristic of Large Firms, but do show the basically flat hiring
numbers of Large Firms after 2013, a period during which Small-Firm hiring
falls noticeably relative to earlier years, while Very-Large-Firm hiring rises.55
Medium-Firm entry-level hiring for the Class of 2017 is down in
number 23.9% from its brief peak in 2012, and down 13.5% since 2007.
Medium Firms make roughly as many new hires today as they did in 2001,
provide 10.7% of the entry-level Law Jobs, and consume 7.1% of the
graduating class, slightly larger proportions than they did in 2001.
4.

Large Firms (51–500 Lawyers)56

Large Firms showed stronger entry-level hiring in the mid- to late-1990s
and again in the mid-2000s but slowed their hiring significantly after 2007.
Entry-level hiring by Large Firms has more or less flattened out since 2010.

54

See supra Fig. 3.7.

55

Compare supra Fig. 3.7, with supra Fig 3.8, and infra Figs. 3.9 & 3.10.

At a time when BigLaw is bigger than ever, it may seem strange to group firms of 51–100
lawyers with those of 101–500 as “Large.” But the purpose of the private-firm categorizations in this
Article is to group firms that exhibit the most similar entry-level hiring patterns over time. Firms of 51–
100 performed strikingly similarly to those of 101–250 and 251–500 in that regard, and noticeably
differently from Medium Firms of 11–50 and Very Large Firms of over 500 lawyers. Compare infra
Figure 3.9, with supra Figure 3.8, and infra Figure 3.10.
56
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Figure 3.9
Entry-Level Law Jobs in Large Firms (51–500 Lawyers)
Classes of 2001–2017
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Unlike other categories, this group’s entry-level hiring peaked in 2000
(with the Class of 1999), just as the dot-com recession was beginning, with a
lower peak in 2008 (the Class of 2007), just as the Great Recession was
beginning. The explanation is likely twofold: The tech boom of the 1990s,
and the financial services boom of the 2000s, fueled rapid growth among
larger firms, which had expanding needs for junior lawyers to perform legal
process work on larger deals and disputes.57 In addition, the number of Very
Large firms was limited until after the turn of the century, when rapid growth
and increasing numbers of big-firm mergers with and acquisitions of other
firms drove greater numbers of firms into the Very Large category.58
The accelerating growth in hiring at the entry level typical of Large
Firms in the mid- to late-1990s and to a lesser degree in the mid-2000s has
given way to stagnancy. Large-Firm hiring for the Class of 2017 is down in
number 40.1% since 2007, and down over 50% from its peak in 1999. It
accounts for an over 40% smaller portion of all Law Jobs and a nearly 50%

57

See Burk & McGowan, Big But Brittle, supra note 50, at 11–13, 20, 22, 23, 25.

Id. at 11–13. To this extent, it is fair to say that the entry-level hiring trends among firms larger
than 50 lawyers exhibited in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, starting with the Class of 2004 or so, are to some degree
an artifact of the category boundaries used in this Article. The distinction on the high end between Large
(51-500) and Very Large (501+) firms does illustrate some important distinctions, however. One is an
apparent difference in the number of firms achieving these respective category size limits—in other words,
it would appear that not every Large Firm that become Very Large (or merged into a Very Large Firm)
over the last 10–20 years was replaced by a Medium Firm that became Large (as those categories are
defined here), and (if it is an accurate inference from the data) that is quite significant. At least as
importantly, the largest firms have continued to hire at a relatively robust rate, while hiring among those
in the next smaller category has stagnated. Compare supra Figure 3.9, with supra Figure 3.8, and infra
Figure 3.10.
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smaller portion of the aggregate graduating class today as it did at its 1999
peak.
5.

Very Large Firms (501+ Lawyers)

Figure 3.10
Entry-Level Law Jobs in Very Large Firms (501+ Lawyers)
Classes of 1991–2017
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Very Large Firms are the only law firms besides Small Firms that have
shown any appreciable and lasting increase in entry-level hiring since the
depths of the Great Recession. Their hiring numbers were small during the
1990s principally because there were few firms larger than 500 lawyers at
that time, but show rapid growth in hiring during the 2000s as the megafirm
comes into vogue, and mergers create greater numbers of them.59 They also
show some cyclical exposure to the economy in the years after the onset of
the Great Recession, which reflects the constraints during that time on their
large-company clients’ expenditures on big transactions and big-case
litigation.60 And while their hiring has risen steadily since hitting its bottom
in 2011, structural forces affecting the staffing and pricing of the complex
legal services these firms provide has limited those increases to some
degree.61
59

See Burk & McGowan, Big But Brittle, supra note 50, at 11–13.

60

See id. at 28.

For a discussion of these structural phenomena and their possible effects, see Burk, New
Normal, supra note 1, at 581–99. See also CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AT THE
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL EXEC. INST. & PEER MONITOR, 2018
REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 14–18 (2018), http://legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/2018-Report-on-the-State-of-the-Legal-Market.pdf
[hereinafter
Georgetown/Thomson Reuters Report]. These forces include downward competitive pressures on pricing
for the substantial portion of complex legal services comprising gathering and organizing documents and
61
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Overall, Very Large Firms’ hiring for the Class of 2017 is up in number
59.4% since its recent bottom in 2011, but down 11.8% since its peak in 2009.
These firms are responsible for 19% of all new Law Jobs in 2017, and 12.5%
of the aggregate graduating class. In short, this sector and Small Firms are
the most dynamic and substantial hiring forces in the entry-level job market
today.
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
From the preceding discussion, it’s apparent that the entry-level LawJobs market is significantly weaker and less capacious than it was ten years
ago. There were 26% fewer Law Jobs available for the graduating Class of
2017 than there were for the Class of 2007. The portion of the graduating
class getting Law Jobs (the Law-Jobs Ratio) has fallen 4.2 points (-6%)
during the same period, and is only as high as it is because of the drastic
reductions in the number of students attending law school. The size of the
aggregate graduating class has fallen from its peak in 2013 (reflecting the
largest entering class in history three years earlier) by 26.5%. If the legal
academy had been able to maintain its enrollment since 2010, the Law-Jobs
Ratio today would be under 50%, meaning that more than half of all law
graduates would not be able to find a job requiring a law license within ten
months after graduating. As it is, more than a third of them still cant.
A.

Market Sectors

Perhaps the most important finding of this Article and its predecessor is
the recognition that different sectors of the entry-level Law-Jobs market serve
differing areas of the market for legal services, and can be differently affected
by the various competitive and economic forces at play at any given time.
Considering market sectors separately:

information (often referred to as “legal process” work), as well as for complex legal services more
generally; the re-sourcing of legal process and other repetitive or client-knowledge-specific work in-house
at the client, or to less expensive labor either inside or outside private law firms (“insourcing,”
“downsourcing,” and “outsourcing,” respectively); the growing large-company client refusal to pay for
inexperienced associates or their training; and a growing shift in the demographics of larger law firms in
which nonpartners stay at firms longer than in prior decades.
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Non-Law-Firm Employers
a.

Academia

This category, which includes teachers, librarians, and administrators at
any school or educational institution,62 has always contributed negligible
numbers of entry-level Law Jobs. There is no reason to believe that will
change. The legal academy itself (which rarely appoints professors straight
out of law school) has experienced a demand shock of its own in recent years,
with the number of applicants shrinking 36% and the number of applications
shrinking 44% between academic years 2011-12 and 2016-17.63 Many law
faculties are downsizing, and new faculty hiring is proceeding at a fraction
of the rate prevailing just a few years ago.64
b.

Business

In-house law departments have never hired significant numbers of
lawyers straight out of law school, preferring to hire laterally after five to ten
years’ of training and experience in BigLaw.65 Although a few companies are
beginning to experiment with training new lawyers themselves, the
phenomenon is still rare and increasing in extent only gradually.66 Thus while
in-house law departments have been expanding in recent years,67 the

62

See 2018 ABA Employment Questionnaire, supra note 12, at 7.

63

See Burk, Organ & Rasiel, Coping Strategies, supra note 34, at (manuscript at 12–14).

See Sarah Lawsky, Who Stopped Hiring?, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 24, 2018, 5:23 PM),
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/who-stopped-hiring.html.
64

65 See, e.g., Julie Brush, Are More Companies Today Hiring Lawyers Straight Out of Law School?,
RECORDER (Jan. 22, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2018/01/22/aremore-companies-today-hiring-lawyers-straight-out-of-law-school?/
[https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=0b678df8-1e5a-40ab-80dbbd1ab551c077&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-RECRDRhdg45lmej&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true].
66 See, e.g., id.; Caroline Spiezio, Summer Internships in Silicon Valley Offer New Route In-House
for Law Students, LAW.COM (Aug. 7, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/08/07/summerinternships-in-silicon-valley-offer-new-route-in-house-for-law-students/
[https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=5537350b-64fe-4f5e-b60123f909d3fed5&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-CORPCMgmd45elfej&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true].
67 See, e.g., Stephanie Forshee, Legal Departments Want to Add More In-House Lawyers, But Will
They?, LAW.COM (Apr. 3, 2018, 9:05 AM), https://www.law.com/2018/04/03/legal-departments-want-toadd-more-in-house-lawyers-but-will-they/ [https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=b35dece2-94f1-470a8409-1c4f2c323a1d&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-CORPCMgmd45edhii&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true]; Burk & McGowan, Big
But Brittle, supra note 50, at 76–87.
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proportion of that hiring at the entry level has been, and can be expected to
continue to be, small.68
c.

Government

Government spending on lawyers is, if anything, more unpopular than
ever. Slack in other parts of the job market may also be inducing government
lawyers to keep their jobs longer, and delay moving into the private sector,
reducing the need for new hires. In addition, many agencies at the state and
federal levels have exploited the surplus of unemployed or underemployed
graduates to offer temporary, part-time, or full-time but unpaid “volunteer”
“internships” that give ambitious new graduates experience they can sell
elsewhere, at the same time blunting any entry-level labor needs those
agencies may be experiencing.69 Here also there is little reason to predict any
expansion in entry-level hiring at a rate greater than the growth in the
domestic economy and population overall.

68 Much optimism has been lavished on law schools’ futures in training compliance officers.
Recent legislation has expanded the role of compliance staff in such industries as securities and healthcare,
but such positions do not require a JD degree, and there is legitimate doubt whether the time and money
required to get there supports the career economically and otherwise. There is also doubt whether a lawschool education is the best preparation for a position that critically depends on an understanding of
institutional dynamics and organizational behavior largely ignored in the JD curriculum. See Deborah J.
Merritt,
Campbell
on
Compliance,
LAW
SCHOOL
CAFÉ
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/campbell-on-compliance/. As of this writing many American law
schools have introduced non-JD compliance programs (some denominated as such; others called degrees
in, e.g., “Health Care Law and Policy”) that last only a year (or two part-time) and eventuate in a pre-JD
Master’s Degree or post-JD LLM. See, e.g., Avi Wolfman-Arent, Are Non-lawyers the Future of Law
School? One School in Delaware Thinks So, WHYY (June 15, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/are-nonlawyers-the-future-of-law-school-one-school-in-delaware-thinks-so/; Derek Muller, One in Ten Law
School Enrollees is Not Part of a JD Program, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL EDUCATION (Jan. 22,
2016), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016/1/one-in-ten-law-school-enrollees-is-not-a-part-of-a-jdprogram. All non-JD programs at accredited American law schools are listed at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/llmdegrees_post_j_d_non_j_d/programs_by_school/. These programs may add revenue streams for
financially struggling law schools but may draw new-graduate hiring away from JDs, and thus deplete
whatever limited support these positions might otherwise have provided to new-JD employment.
69 See, e.g., Parth Shah, Challenging D.C.’s Tradition of Unpaid Internships, NPR, (Dec. 7, 2016,
3:42
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/12/07/502018797/challenging-d-c-s-tradition-of-unpaidgovernment-internships. Wage and hour restrictions do not apply to volunteers at government and
nonprofit agencies; thus it is perfectly legal for them to offer unpaid internships. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR,
WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT (2018), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
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Judicial Clerkships

The number of such positions, as well as their share of the number of
Law Jobs and of the aggregate graduating class, has proved fairly stable since
2001.70 While nearly all of these positions at the entry level last only a year
or two, they are widely considered gateways to better Law Jobs. Neither the
state nor the federal judiciary should be expected to expand at any
extraordinary rate, and there is arguably a gradual trend among judges in both
systems to opt for more experienced (and thus non-entry-level), and longer
term, staff research attorneys rather than entry-level law clerks. These factors
augur continued stability with slow growth for this category.
e.

Public Interest

The congressionally created Legal Services Corporation, which funds
many legal aid programs for the poor across the country, has suffered years
of budget cuts, and the current administration and others before it have
expressed ambitions to eliminate it altogether.71 Legal services programs
funded by state-bar IOLTA funds and nongovernment grants have been
asphyxiated by years of record-low interest rates and financial hard times
limiting charitable giving.72 Nonprofits other than legal services programs
don’t need or hire many lawyers, and especially not ones with little or no
experience. And both legal services programs and other nonprofits, like
government agencies, have access to both school-funded and unpaid
“volunteer” interns to help meet their labor needs.73 Public Interest offers
almost a third fewer entry-level Law Jobs today than it did 10 years ago.74

70

See supra Table 3.2 and Figures 3.4A–C.

See, e.g., Hilarie Bass, Thank You for Your Efforts to Defend Legal Aid (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://maestro.abanet.org/list/inxsxxpc/170919J/mlqmgy.vib?a0=0DEF&a2=Bernie.Burk%40bernieburk
.com&a1=%26UNSUBSCRIBE_TOKEN%3B (Sept. 19, 2017) (email from the ABA President: “over
the past 12 years the House has had a number of amendments filed and has taken 8 votes to cut or eliminate
LSC funding”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump Budget Eliminates Legal Services Corp. Funding, ABA
JOURNAL
(Mar.
16,
2017,
8:45
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/trump_budget_eliminates_funding_for_legal_services_corp/?ut
m_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email.
71

72 Interest on Legal Trust Account (“IOLTA”) funds derive from legislative programs extant in
nearly every state that require lawyers and the depositary institutions at which they maintain their client
trust accounts to pay the interest accruing on most of those accounts to the State to fund legal services for
indigents. See, e.g., Cheryl Miller, Legal Aid Funding Still Waiting for Recovery, RECORDER (Dec. 18,
2015).
73 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 69. On school-funded positions, see Burk, New
Normal, supra note 1, at 559 n.38.
74

See supra Table 3.2.
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Despite the admirable intentions of many prospective law students to use a
law degree in service of the public interest,75 it is very difficult to imagine
this sector becoming a growth area.
f.

General Outlook

Nothing about any non-law-firm sector of the entry-level Law-Jobs
market suggests any significant increase in entry-level hiring is in the offing.
Growth commensurate with the domestic economy and population overall is
the best that can be expected.
2.

Private Law Firms

As noted above, while there are significantly fewer entry-level Law Jobs
than there were ten years ago,76 different sizes of law firms have been affected
differently and for different reasons:
a.

Small Firms (2–10 lawyers)

Small Firms were the most active source of new hiring when larger-firm
hiring remained more depressed in the wake of the Great Recession.77 The
absolute number of Small-Firm hires has fallen in recent years as the size of
the graduating class has fallen, but Small Firms today account for a larger
portion of all Law Jobs (21.3%) and of the aggregate graduating class
(14.1%) than any other market sector.78
Currently, the competitive and technological developments that are
slowing Large and Very Large Firm growth are by their nature much less
salient to Small Firms, as these developments affect predominantly big-case
and big-deal engagements.79 Small Firms are feeling some competition from
technology in some of the simplest and most repetitive tasks for which they
are engaged (e.g., simple estate plans; routine small-company formation;
uncontested divorces). This competition at the lowest-cost end of the market
may increase as interactive legal software improves and more consumers
become more comfortable with relying on computers to serve personal needs
75 See Jodi Teti, Are More Students Going to Law School as a Reaction to Trump?, BLUEPRINT
LSAT: LSAT BLOG (Aug. 29, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://blueprintlsat.com/lsatblog/law-school-2/studentsgoing-law-school-reaction-trump/ [hereinafter Teti, Law School as a Reaction to Trump].
76

See supra Table 3.3.

77

See supra Table 3.3 & Figure 3.7.

78

See supra Tables 3.2, 3.3 & Figure 3.7.

79

See supra note 60.
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of this kind. Likely this shift (in part technological, in part generational) will
occur relatively gradually over time, and will affect only a modest portion of
many Small Firms’ typical workload for some years to come.
Small Firms have shown themselves to be less sensitive to the ups and
downs of the broader economy than larger firms.80 While the number of these
positions ran up more rapidly in the mid-2000s and early 2010s, generally
growth in this sector has been gradual and responsive to the growth of the
population and economy overall. There is no reason to believe this will
change materially in the foreseeable future.
b.

Medium Firms (11-50 lawyers)

Other than a very brief spike around 2012 that likely reflected the
depressed hiring at larger firms (making better-qualified candidates available
to Medium and Small ones), the number of new positions at Medium Firms
has remained basically flat since 2001.81 Probably the number of such firms
has fallen as well, as more Medium Firms have allowed themselves to be
acquired by larger ones.82 As the size of the graduating class has fallen,
Medium Firms have taken up a fairly steady portion of the available Law
Jobs (about 10%) and the aggregate graduating class (about 7%). The
available data suggest that this share of the hiring has shifted toward the
smaller Medium Firms, which likely perform more similarly to Small Firms;
and away from the larger ones, which face the difficulty of increasing
complexity of administration without adequately compensating economies of
scale in growing from 26 to 50 lawyers. These phenomena may explain the
increasing number of Medium Firms sacrificing their independence and
succumbing to acquisition. Medium Firms thus are not likely to prove an area
of dynamic entry-level hiring growth in the foreseeable future.

80 This accords with common sense. While some of the work typical to smaller firms (e.g., estate
planning; small business formation and counseling) is responsive to potential clients’ financial resources,
a good deal of it is more acyclical (e.g., personal injury; workers’ compensation; family law; employeeside employment work—need for all of which arises in both good times and bad), and some may actually
increase in hard times (e.g., consumer bankruptcy).
81

See supra Table 3.3 & Figure 3.8.

See, e.g., Burk & McGowan, Big But Brittle, supra note 50, at 12–13, 29; supra note 70; Scott
Flaherty, Firm Mergers Near Record Pace at Midyear Point, LAW.COM (July 2, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.law.com/2018/07/02/firm-tie-ups-near-record-pace-at-mid-yearpoint/?et=editorial&bu=Law.com&cn=20180703&src=EMC-Email&pt=Morning%20Minute;
Nell
Gluckman, Report: 2015 Could Set Record for Number of Law Firm Mergers, LAW.COM (Oct. 5, 2018,
5:08 PM), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202738996969/Report-2015-Could-Set-Record-forNumber-of-Law-Firm-Mergers#ixzz3oHkwNOsp.
82
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Large Firms (51–500 lawyers)

There were relatively few firms bigger than 500 lawyers in the 1990s,
and during this period Large Firms’ number and share of new hires were more
robust.83 The number of new-graduate hires in this category is currently at its
lowest recorded levels ever (other than during a brief dip in 2011).84 Large
Firms’ portion of all Law Jobs and all graduates has, as for Medium Firms,
risen slightly from the depths of the post-recession dip but, as with Medium
Firms, this increase is likely attributable more to the reduction in the number
of Law Jobs and graduates than to any strength in this sector.
Large Firms are most susceptible to the structural forces driving down
rates (prices) for the work they do; they compete on price with Very Large
Firms for complex work that is now viewed as more commodified. They have
kept their average actual hourly rates lower (or increased them less) as Very
Large Firms have continued to increase theirs, and have reduced their costs
by using either low-cost resources in-firm for legal process and other
repetitive work, or else sourced this work outside the firm to the client or a
third-party outsourcer.85 Once again, entry-level hiring growth in this sector
more rapid than that of the economy overall seems unlikely in the foreseeable
future.
d.

Very Large Firms (501+ lawyers)

This is the sector whose future hiring patterns are hardest to predict.
Certainly it has been one of the most dynamic in hiring growth in recent
years.86 Some of that growth likely has to do with sheer size and dispersion
alone: When you have 1,000 lawyers scattered across many offices and a very
large footprint, ordinary attrition requires you to hire a great many
replacements every year just to stay where you were.

83

See supra Table 3.3 & Figure 3.9.

84

See supra Table 3.3 & Figure 3.9.

See Nicholas Bruch, Midsized Firms Are Struggling Where Competition is Fiercest, LAW.COM
(May 31, 2017, 4:27 PM), http://www.law.com/sites/ali/2017/05/31/midsized-firms-are-strugglingwhere-competition-is-fiercest/; Aebra Coe, Why Midsize Firms Are Stealing Work From BigLaw, LAW360
(Dec. 7, 2016, 12:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/869529/why-midsize-firms-are-stealingwork-from-biglaw; Miriam Rozen, Billing Rate Gap Widens as Big Firms Demand Ever-Higher
Premiums,
LAW.COM:
THE
A M.
LAWYER
(Feb.
28,
2018,
2:12
PM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/02/27/billing-rate-gap-widens-as-big-firms-demand-everhigher-premiums/; Jennifer Smith, Smaller Law Firms Get More M&A Work, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2014,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/smaller-law-firms-get-more-m-a-work-1407211262; supra
note 60 and authorities cited; Georgetown/Thomson Reuters Report, supra note 61, at 14–18.
85

86

See supra Table 3.3 & Figure 3.10.
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In addition, some of Very Large Firms’ hiring volume has to do with the
economics of their practices: Some of these firms are known for their special
ability to excel in globe-spanning or otherwise truly one-of-a-kind, ultrahigh-stakes transactions and disputes.87 This work tends to be fee-insensitive,
and therefore less susceptible to the pricing pressures that have been affecting
staffing and pricing of more commonly recurring complex legal work.88
While large corporate clients currently disfavor (or outright forbid) including
(or at least billing for) junior lawyers in many engagements today,89 in these
exceptional “bespoke” matters highly credentialed junior associates’ cost and
efficiency are sometimes viewed as less important than their intelligence and
industry, and they can be more liberally included on the very large teams that
accomplish these exceptionally complex undertakings.
In addition, Very Large Firms are more likely than other firms to have
established in-firm legal process staffs, a corps of lawyers typically sited in
an affordable location in the Midwest or South who do exclusively discovery,
document, due diligence, form contract, and similar repetitive work. Such
“staff” or “diligence” or “discovery” counsel are paid perhaps a third of what
a junior associate is paid, and are billed out to clients at correspondingly
lower rates.90 How much of Very Large Firms’ more active entry-level hiring
87 Not all Very Large Firms actually meet this description (though virtually all of them claim they
do, as do many Large Firms). And, conversely, some Large Firms and even a few ultra-high-end boutiques
do significant amounts of truly “bespoke” work. Wachtell Lipton is currently around 250 lawyers and
handles some of the most demanding mergers and acquisition work (both transactional and litigation) in
the world. See Wachtell Lipton Rosen Katz, LAW.COM: INT’L, https://www.law.com/international/lawfirm-profile/?id=318&name=Wachtell,-Lipton,-Rosen-%26-Katz (last visited Dec. 22, 2018). Cravath is
currently around 500 lawyers and has a similar reputation. See Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, LAW.COM,
https://www.law.com/law-firm-profile/?id=71&name=Cravath,-Swaine-%26-Moore-LLP (last visited
Dec. 22, 2018). Some of the most profitable firms in America, such as Kirkland & Ellis, Skadden Arps,
Latham & Watkins, and Weil Gotshal, have well over 1,000 lawyers each. See List of US Law Firms By
Profits
Per
Partner,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_US_law_firms_by_profits_per_partner (last updated Oct. 8, 2018).
Other Very Large Firms, while undoubtedly good at what they do, do not universally command the very
highest rates for the most difficult and unusual work.
88

See supra notes 59, 83.

The recent increase in BigLaw first-year associate salaries to $190,000, with corresponding
increases up the scale, was met with open hostility among corporate counsel. See, e.g., Dan Clark, CLOC
Survey Shows In-House Legal May Rethink Staffing After Associate Raises—Or Maybe Not, LAW.COM
(June 15, 2018, 4:27 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/06/15/cloc-survey-shows-in-house-legal-mayrethink-staffing-after-associate-raises-or-maybenot/?et=editorial&bu=Law.com&cn=20180618&src=EMC-Email&pt=Morning%20Minute. Generally,
increasing numbers of corporate clients are refusing to pay for junior associates’ time. See Miriam Rozen,
Pay for Associate Hours? More Companies Say ‘No Thanks,’ LAW.COM: THE AM. LAWYER (Sept. 19,
2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202798363967/; Burk, New Normal,
supra note 1, at 586–87.
89

90 See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 575 n.69 and authorities cited; Burk & McGowan, Big
But Brittle, supra note 50, at 82.
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is attributable to recruiting elite graduates receiving $190,000 per year and
how much to staff discovery departments far from their fancier urban offices
that pay a third of that is not reflected in the available data, which do not
distinguish between the two positions despite their obvious differences.
In all events, the last ten years have seen a growing segmentation
between a relatively small number of exceptionally profitable firms, many
but not all of them Very Large, and somewhat less (but still very) profitable
firms, both Large and Very Large.91 The supra-profitable segment of the
American legal profession, which probably does not exceed twenty or most
forty firms, can be expected to make more substantial numbers of new lawyer
hires because of their size and the economics of their practices just described.
What remains uncertain is how much the structural forces dragging
down the pricing and staffing of some legal services will affect these superelite firms’ staffing choices. Demand for these firms’ services is somewhat
stronger than for complex legal work overall, but still increasing only
modestly.92 Some of these firms face the overstaffing and underproductivity
problems that seem to plague many Large and Very Large Firms.93 There is
also increasing competition abroad from internationally-based firms
(especially London’s “Magic Circle” firms) and global accounting and
consulting conglomerates (the so-called “Big Four”) for the supra-profitable
work that distinguishes their performance.94
91 See, e.g., David Lat, The 2014 Am Law 100: The Super-Rich Get Richer, ABOVE LAW (Apr. 28,
2014, 3:46 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2014/04/the-2014-am-law-100-the-super-rich-get-richer/; Gina
Passarella, Can Firms in the Am Law 51-100 Keep from Falling Further Behind?, LAW.COM (May 1,
2017, 7:49 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/05/01/can-firms-in-the-am-law-51-100-keepfrom-falling-further-behind/?et=editorial&bu=Law.com&cn=20170502&src=EMCEmail&pt=ALM%20Morning%20Minute; Joe Patrice, Top Firms Get Richer in Otherwise Poor Year For
Legal Industry, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 13, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/02/top-firmsget-richer-in-otherwise-poor-year-for-the-legal-industry/; Burk & McGowan, Big But Brittle, supra note
50, at 100–01.
92

See supra note 60 and accompanying text; Part IV.A.2.c.

93

Supra note 92; infra note 96.

See, e.g., Alex Berry, PwC Eyes Global Expansion of Its Flexible Lawyering Service, LAW.COM
(Feb. 23, 2018, 5:08 AM), https://www.law.com/2018/02/22/no-limit-on-growth-pwc-eyes-globalexpansion-of-flexi-lawyering-service-as-1000-sign-up-sincelaunch/?et=editorial&bu=Law.com&cn=20180223&src=EMCEmail&pt=ALM%20Morning%20Minute; John Kang & Anna Zhang, Law Firms Uneasy as the Big Four
Make
Their
Big
Push
in
Asia,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
3,
2018,
12:38
PM),
https://www.law.com/2018/08/03/law-firms-uneasy-as-the-big-four-make-their-big-push-inasia/?et=editorial&bu=Law.com&cn=20180806&src=EMC-Email&pt=Morning%20Minute;
Roy
Strom, The Law Firm Disrupted: PwC Will Take Your Client’s Call Now, LAW.COM: THE AM. LAWYER
(Jan. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/sites/almstaff/2018/01/12/the-law-firmdisrupted-pwc-will-take-your-clients-callnow/?kw=The%20Law%20Firm%20Disrupted:%20PwC%20Will%20Take%20Your%20Client%27s%
20Call%20Now&et=editorial&bu=The%20American%20Lawyer&cn=20180112&src=EMCEmail&pt=Afternoon%20Update.
94
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And even with this sector’s growing claim on the new workforce
emerging from the academy each year, at this point it still accounts for only
12.5% of the graduating class.95 The extremely lucrative and in many cases
very challenging positions these firms offer have always been available only
to a modest minority of highly accomplished graduates, mostly from the most
elite law schools. That is unlikely to change, though that elite minority may
expand a bit.
e.

General Outlook

In an otherwise strong economy, demand for law firms’ services
generally remains stagnant. Sophisticated observers of the legal services
market have documented flat demand for at least a decade.96 There have been
modest (single-digit) increases in some law firms’ revenues, but these appear
to be attributable principally to rate increases, not increased demand.97 And
obviously it is increased demand for services that drives more hiring, not
increased prices for the same amount of work. In fact, most Medium to Very
Large Firms appear to have been overstaffed for a long time.98 Sophisticated
observers predict more of the same in the foreseeable future.99

95 See supra Table 3.3; see also Karen Sloan, The Top 50 Go-To Law Schools, LAW.COM (Mar. 7,
2019,
7:00
P.M.),
https://www.law.com/2019/03/07/the-top-50-go-to-law-schools2/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=enl&utm_campaign=morningminute&utm_content=20190311&ut
m_term=law (showing that only about 15% of the accredited law schools in the country send at least 15%
of their graduates to the 100 largest US firms).
96

Georgetown Thomson/Reuters Report, supra note 60, at 4, 14.

See CITI PRIVATE BANK & HILDEBRANDT CONSULTING LLC, 2018 CLIENT ADVISORY 3–4
(2018),
https://www.privatebank.citibank.com/ivc/docs/2018CitiHildebrandtClientAdvisory.pdf
(“Through the first nine months of 2017, the US law firm industry saw revenue growth of 3.6 percent.
This has been entirely driven by standard rate increases (4.0 percent) as demand declined by 0.2 percent
and collections slowed by 0.9 percent”; “51 percent of firms saw demand decline in the first nine months
of 2017 versus the first nine months of 2016, as compared to just 27 percent of firms on average during
2004-07. This almost even dispersion between firms who grow and firms who shrink in a given period
has been a constant since 2010 and it illustrates how, in this modest growth environment, one firm’s
success comes at the expense of another firm.”) [hereinafter CITI/HILDEBRANDT CLIENT ADVISORY].
97

98 See Georgetown/Thomson Reuters Report, supra note 61, at 5–6; Georgetown/Thomson
Reuters Report, supra note 61, at 5–6; Jason Tashea, Half of Firms Miss Billing Goals and Majority of
Partners Resist Change, Says New Survey, ABA JOURNAL (May 21, 2018, 4:20 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/half_of_firms_miss_billing_goals_majority_of_partners_resist_
change_says_ne/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email;
Debra
Cassens Weiss, Law Firm Leaders Report Lawyer Oversupply and ‘Chronically Underperforming
Lawyers,’
ABA
JOURNAL
(May
24,
2017,
4:26
PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_firm_leaders_report_lawyer_oversupply_and_chronically_
underperforming_l/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email; .
99 See CITI/HILDEBRANDT CLIENT ADVISORY, supra note 97, at 6; Georgetown/Thomson Reuters
Report, supra note 61, at 14.
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As a measure of the industry’s recalibrated expectations, predictions
from a bank that finances many law firms for growth in the demand for legal
services in 2018 of 3.3% (roughly the likely rate of GDP growth during that
year) have been celebrated as a recent-term record. Moreover, most of that
predicted demand increase is concentrated in the 50 most profitable firms in
the country; the Am Law Second Hundred is predicted to see a small drop in
demand in 2019.100
B.

The Entry-Level Law-Jobs Market Overall

As noted above, for a while many voices in the academy insisted that
the contraction in the entry-level job market was entirely cyclical (that is,
reflective only of the economic downturn comprising the Great Recession),
and that everything would soon return to normal.101 Those voices haven’t
been heard from for a while. The Great Recession is well behind us; general
unemployment is at historic lows; the economy is widely viewed as strong.102
Yet the number of entry-level Law Jobs filled per year is down 26% from the
days just before the recession.103
Among Large and Very Large Firms, structural forces forcing down the
staffing and pricing of complex legal services seem to be the only plausible
explanation.104 There is no reason why any of those forces should abate
anytime soon, and in fact they likely have not yet fully taken hold, suggesting
further headwinds to growth in entry-level legal hiring at larger law firms for

100 Roy Strom, Wells Fargo Adds to the Consensus: The Law Firm Market Is Setting Records,
LAW.COM:
THE
A M.
LAWYER
(Dec.
7,
2018,
12:03
PM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/12/07/wells-fargo-adds-to-the-consensus-the-law-firmmarket-is-setting-records/.
101

See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 543 & n.2, 581; supra note 32 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Ben Casselman, With 8 Years of Job Gains, Unemployment Is Lowest Since 1969,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/business/economy/jobsreport.html?emc=edit_na_20181005&nl=breaking-news&nlid=13011787ing-news&ref=cta.
102

103 See supra Table 3.1. The federal Bureau of Labor Statistics’ broader measure of the number of
persons employed in the legal industry, which includes practicing attorneys at all levels of seniority (not
just at the entry level) as well as legal support staff, judges and court staff (excluding self-employed solos
and law-firm partners), is 3% lower than it was in 2008, and has remained essentially flat for quite some
time. See Data Retrieval: Employment, Hours, and Earnings (CES), BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
https://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cesbtab1.htm (under “Professional and business services” select the
check-box to the right of “Legal services” under the “Seasonally adjusted” column, scroll down and select
the “Retrieve data” button); Scott Flaherty, Legal Sector Adds Jobs in September After Two Months of
Decline,
LAW.COM:
THE
A M.
LAWYER
(Oct.
5,
2018,
1:00
PM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/10/05/legal-sector-adds-jobs-in-september-after-twomonths-of-decline/ (“From December 2016 onward, the total has remained between 1.13 million and 1.14
million people employed in the industry.”).
104

See Burk, New Normal, supra note 1, at 581–99; supra note 60.
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the foreseeable future.105 As for Small and Medium Firms, except for the
recent gyrations induced by the Great Recession, hiring growth has
historically been, and is likely to remain, gradual.106 Similarly, entry-level
hiring has remained largely flat with some very gradual expansion for nonlaw-firm employers, and again appears likely to stay that way.
In short, the entry-level Law-Jobs market has reset to a significantly
lower benchmark, and there is no reason to expect it to grow any faster than
the domestic economy or population at large. The United States’ population
has grown on average 0.7% per year since 2010,107 and gross domestic
product generally expanded at a rate of 1.5%–3% per year during the same
period.108 The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts even slower growth in
overall legal services employment, about 8% total from 2016 to 2026.109
Overall, an average annual growth rate in entry-level Law-Jobs hiring of 1%2% per year for the foreseeable future seems like a reasonable guess.
C.

Implications for the Legal Academy

These changes bear an important message that not all law schools may
be heeding. While the number of applicants and applications to accredited
law schools declined steadily and significantly after 2010, total applicants
and applications each rose about 8% in 2018.110 The increase was also
skewed toward applicants with stronger conventional qualifications, a
marked change from prior years.111 A contemporaneous survey of
prospective law students suggests the increase was prompted in significant

105

Id.

106

See supra Parts III.C.2–.3, IV.A.2.a.–b.

See Niraj Chokshi, Growth of U.S. Population Is at Slowest Pace Since 1937, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/us/usa-population-growth.html.
107

108 TRADING
ECONOMICS,
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp.
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp.
109 See supra note 101; Occupational Outlook Handbook,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/home.htm (last modified Apr. 13, 2018).

,

BUREAU LAB. STAT.,

110 See YTD ABA 2019 Applicant and Application Counts, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL,
https://report.lsac.org/VolumeSummaryOriginalFormat.aspx?dataDate=8-8-2018 (last visited Aug. 8,
2018) (select “US Applicant Counts”) (Law School Admissions Council (“LSAC”) applications data for
2018). There was a small increase in the number of applicants reported by LSAC in 2016, but this may
have been an artifact of a change in LSAC’s counting methodology, which for the first time included both
spring and fall applicants rather than (as previously) only those seeking admission for fall term. See Burk,
Organ & Rasiel, Coping Strategies, supra note 34 at (manuscript at 132 fig. 1.1, 14 & n.34).
111 See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, supra note 110 (select “US LSAT Scores”) (greater
increases in number of applicants with LSAT scores of 155 or better compared with those with lower
scores). Compare id., with Burk, Organ & Rasiel, Coping Strategies, supra note 33, at (manuscript at 14–
15, Fig. 1.2).
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part by a surge in graduating college students’ interest in involving
themselves in the political events of the day.112
While seeking to facilitate more active and direct political participation
is undoubtedly an appropriate (indeed, an admirable) motivation to obtain a
law degree, for the reasons just discussed there is unfortunately little reason
to believe that significantly greater numbers of Law Jobs will be available to
the class of 2021 than are available today. The continuing improvement in
the Law-Jobs Ratio (the proportion of the graduating class obtaining Law
Jobs within 10 months after graduation) is attributable specifically and
uniquely to the substantial decline in the number of law graduates seeking
employment.113 Thus continued improvement for future graduating classes of
the Law-Jobs Ratio, which is a direct measure of the likelihood of the average
graduate’s obtaining a Law Job, is in most cases likely dependent on keeping
entering classes at or near current sizes in the absence of specific and
quantifiable reasons for a particular law school to believe that the
employment markets that school predominantly serves can accommodate in
three or four years the extra graduates it plans to matriculate now. Deans and
admissions officers who expand their entering classes without such grounds
do so at the risk that a commensurately smaller portion of their graduating
classes will be able to get jobs that justify the time and effort of obtaining a
JD. Students choosing among multiple law-school acceptances would be
wise to bear this in mind as well.
The recently released disclosures regarding 2018 entering-class size and
qualifications exhibit some important patterns.114 While the applicant pool
expanded by about 8% in 2018, the aggregate entering class size increased
by only 3%. Predictably, that additional 3% was not evenly distributed. Prof.
Jerome Organ has shown that there is a roughly linear relationship between
the 2018 changes in a law school’s entering class size and its 2017 median
LSAT, with law schools having a median LSAT of 160 or greater (about the
80th percentile among all test-takers) having increased their entering-class
sizes on average by 6.4%, while law schools with a median LSAT of 149 or
less (about the 40th percentile of all test takers) having actually reduced their
entering-class sizes on average by 5.9%. “All of the growth in enrollment,”
he reports, “functionally occurred among law schools with a median LSAT
of 155 or higher in 2017 [about the 63rd percentile among all test-takers].”115
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See supra note 75.

113

See supra Part III.A.
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entering-class
http://abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx.
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115 Jerry Organ, Analyzing Enrollment And Profile Patterns Across Different Tiers Of Law Schools
For Fall 2018 (Jan. 2, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/01/analyzing-enrollment-
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Even more intriguing, and in striking contrast with recent years, 95% of all
accredited law schools either increased (54%) or held (41%) their entering
class’s median LSAT scores in 2018.116 This appears to reflect a widespread
strategy to preserve or improve the conventional qualifications of the entering
class, with increasing revenue by increasing class size as at most a secondary
goal at most institutions.117
The wisdom of any law school’s increase in entering-class size remains
to be seen, and its effectiveness appears likely to vary with the circumstances
of each school. Here’s why: There is no discernible evidence that the
reductions in entry-level hiring over the last ten years are the result of any
growing mismatch between the abilities or skills of new graduates and the
needs of legal employers generally—while it can be argued how much better
law schools have gotten at meeting prospective employers’ needs over the
last decade, there does not appear to be any serious argument they have gotten
any worse. Instead, the reductions in entry-level hiring appear to result from
structural changes in what new law graduates are used for in the legal services
market and under what circumstances an employer’s marginal addition of
more of them at any given time is economic. Thus, although the larger
graduating classes three and four years from now will generally be as “good”
as or “better” than current graduates (in terms of the conventional
qualifications on which law schools rely to make admissions decisions), there
would seem to be limited reason to believe that this fact would induce legal
employers to hire more of them.
That said, it bears noting that the overall expansion in the 2018 entering
class is only 3%, not much more than the rate at which this Article predicts
the entry-level Law-Jobs market might reasonably be expected to expand.118
But as just discussed, that 3% increase is an academy-wide average, and a
good many law schools have expanded their entering classes a good deal
more than that.119 Roughly half the law schools in the country, including
and-profile-patterns-across-different-tiers-of-law-schools-for-fall-2018.html [hereinafter Organ, 2018
Enrollment]; see also Karen Sloan, First-Year Enrollment Soars by Double Digits at Some Law Schools,
LAW.COM (Aug. 21, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/08/21/first-year-enrollment-soars-bydouble-digits-at-some-law-schools/.
116

Organ, 2018 Enrollment, supra note 115.

In other research, Prof. Organ and the author, along with economist Emma Rasiel, have shown
that these strategic priorities became widespread in the legal academy during the Great Recession and its
aftermath. For more prestigious institutions, the strategy likely was motivated by a desire to preserve or
enhance prestige; for less prestigious institutions, it likely was motived by a desire to avoid regulatory
consequences triggered by the ABA’s accreditation standards requiring the matriculation only of students
reasonably likely to be able to complete the course of study and pass a bar exam. See Burk, Organ &
Rasiel, Coping Strategies, supra note 34, at (manuscript at 36– 40).
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See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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some that are well-regarded in their local markets, have Law-Jobs Ratios that
are under the aggregate Class of 2017 average of 65.9%, and a Law-Jobs
Ratio of 65.9% still leaves over a third of the class without a Law Job ten
months after graduation. Under these circumstances, a goal of maintaining
current levels of placement success seems an anemic ambition for any law
school whose placement numbers are not excellent already.
It also is not insignificant that the bulk of the recent entering-class
growth has taken place among relatively more prestigious law schools.120
There likely is a “prestige effect” that will to some degree reduce the erosion
of some more prestigious law schools’ Law-Jobs Ratios as their class sizes
increase, but the strength of this effect will typically depend on how highly
regarded a particular law school is relative to others with which it competes
in the job-placement market. In addition, the extent of any such effect for the
substantial majority of law schools will likely be limited and dynamically
dependent on other competing law schools’ actions, and accordingly quite
difficult to predict. There also may be geographical or specialty areas
uniquely or predominantly served by a particular law school that provide
reason to believe that employment outcomes for that school may improve at
greater rates than the job market as a whole. But such a conclusion must
depend on a clear-eyed, data-driven analysis of features demonstrably
specific to that law school. Generalized optimism regarding some impending
employment tide that will lift all student boats will probably prove for many
only a prelude to a shipwreck.121
V.

CONCLUSION

The number of Law Jobs for new graduates is unlikely to get a lot bigger
in the foreseeable future than it is today. Gradual growth is likely; rapid
growth of the kind seen in large parts of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s is not.
In recent years, the probability of eventually obtaining a job that made
use of a law degree and provided sufficient personal and economic rewards
to justify the effort, time, and cost involved has increasingly influenced
prospective law students’ choices whether to attend law school. The LawJobs market began to contract after 2007; by 2011, applicants were staying
120

Id.

Those law schools less concerned with prestige that are choosing to raise revenue by increasing
enrollment as far as they can without violating ABA accreditation Standard 501 should beware the
deterrent effect poor employment outcomes has had on the enrollment of increasingly vigilant prospective
students. See infra note 123. In addition, responsible observers have suggested that the ABA deter this
strategy by making minimum employment outcomes a condition on continued accreditation. See Scott F.
Norberg, JDs and Jobs: The Case for an ABA Accreditation Standard on Employment Outcomes,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998306 (2017).
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away in droves. Law students are increasingly attending to individual law
schools’ employment outcomes (behind location and school prestige, which
itself is correlated with employment outcomes) in deciding whether or where
to matriculate.122
At the risk of shameless repetition, increasing entering class size is
likely to degrade employment outcomes at graduation three (or for part-time
students, four) years later, with the degree of degradation likely inversely
related to the expanding law school’s reputation for overall quality relative
to the other schools with which it competes for matriculants.123 In other
words, the weaker a law school’s reputation, the less likely (absent particular
identifiable and unusual circumstances specific to that law school) it will be
able to place its graduates in desirable positions. Poor employment outcomes
will be reflected in rankings losses and deterioration in the size and quality
(as measured by the conventional metrics of LSAT or other standardized test
score and undergraduate grade-point average) of that school’s applicant pool.
This cycle may rapidly become irreversible at particular institutions and thus
is wisely avoided.
More widespread deterioration of employment outcomes would likely
drive more prospective law students toward other career choices, shrinking
the size and quality of the applicant pool for everyone as it did after 2007.124
These circumstances bear all the earmarks of a classic collective action
problem, and the incentives—or to put it a bit more colorfully, temptations—
are clear. It is difficult to avoid sounding censorious (or Cassandra-esque) in
these circumstances—especially when I have the luxury of not having a
budget to meet or a law school to run. But Cassandra was, after all, granted
the gift of prophecy.125 It was just conjoined with the curse that no one would
believe her.

122 ASS’N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, BEFORE THE JD: UNDERGRADUATE VIEWS ON LAW
SCHOOL 54, Fig. 8.1 (AALS and Gallup 2018), (noting that among over 2,700 first-year law students from
over 80 law schools, location, reputation and financial support offered were three of the five most
important criteria in selecting law school (along with employment outcomes and quality of faculty);
Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Analyzing Law School Choice 20, Table 4 (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper, Paper No. 186, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3309815
(noting that among students at four different types of law schools, two of the most significant factors that
influenced choice of law school were reputation and financial aid (along with job placement).
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See supra Part IV.C.
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See The Myth of Cassandra, GREEK MYTHS & MYTHOLOGY, https://www.greekmythsgreekmythology.com/the-myth-of-cassandra/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).
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